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ABSTRACT
The labor supply and other work incentive effects of welfare programs have long been a central
concern in economic research. Work has also been an increasing focus of policy reforms in the U.S.,
culminating with a number of major policy changes in the 1990s whose intent was to increase
employment and earnings levels of welfare recipients and other disadvantaged individuals. This paper
reviews the economic research on this topic, covering both the theoretical models that have been
developed as well as the empirical findings from econometric studies of the effects of existing
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IV. SummaryThe work incentives of programs which provide means-tested transfer benefits to the low-
income population has been a subject of increasing concern to voters and policy-makers in the
U.S.    Interest in work incentives first arose in the 1960s, when caseloads in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program rose dramatically, and Congress lowered the tax rate
on earnings in the program to encourage work.  Increased interest in encouraging work among
welfare recipients gradually grew in the 1970s and 1980s, with a shift in focus toward work
requirements rather than lowered tax rates.   In the 1990s, major new policy developments
occurred whose focus was on increasing work, including 1996 legislation introducing major new
work requirements into the AFDC program as well as the expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), an earnings subsidy program.    Increased interest in encouraging work
simultaneously has occurred in disability programs and the Food Stamp program.    Similar
reforms have developed in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom with the recent
introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit and with the welfare reform there termed the
“New Deal.”
Research on work and labor supply issues related to welfare reform has also long been
the subject of attention by economists.   In the 1960s, both James Tobin and Milton Friedman
noted that the 100 percent marginal tax rates which were, at that time, imposed by some welfare
programs discouraged work and that a negative income tax (NIT) with tax rates less than 100
percent was one solution (Friedman, 1962; Tobin, 1965).   The NIT is now a staple of
undergraduate textbooks.  The economics profession conducted an enormous amount of research
on the NIT in the 1970s, with much of the focus on the development of new econometric2
techniques for the analysis of work incentives, as well as a focus on the analysis of several
random-assignment experimental tests of a negative income tax.  After something of a research
lull in the late 1970s and 1980s, there has been a resurgence of research interest in the 1990s in
these issues which is still underway.   Econometric methods have shifted toward more reduced
form methods which make identification more transparent but whose results are less convenient
for generalizability than the older structural methods.   Much of the analysis has likewise shifted
from the estimation of underlying models of behavior to the impact estimation of specific
programmatic reforms.  
I. U.S. Policy and Institutional Background
Table 1 shows some of the major welfare programs in the U.S. and their characteristics
relevant to labor supply--who is eligible, the form of assistance, average transfer amounts, and
marginal tax rates.   The most well-known cash program, the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) program, provides benefits primarily to single mothers and their children; the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program serves low income aged, blind, and disabled
individuals and families; the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) serves only those with positive
earnings, albeit all individuals and families in that category; child care programs likewise serve
only those who are working and with children; and the Medicaid program serves the aged and
disabled as well as single mothers and their children, the latter overlapping heavily with the
TANF population.  Only the Food Stamp program and housing programs are universal in
eligibility (aside from low income and assets), and even the latter is unique because it is rationed
in quantity and hence not universally eligible in that sense.  That leaves the Food Stamp program1  In all cases, of course, because benefits are only eligible for those with incomes below
specified amounts, there is a labor supply disincentive.  This is the standard labor supply effect to
be discussed in Section II below.
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as the only truly universal means-tested transfer programs in the U.S.
This categorization of the population raises two issues.   One is whether individuals can
alter their eligibility status and change their labor supply in the process by making themselves
eligible for a higher level of benefits.  In some cases this might be desirable, as in the case of the
EITC or child care where individuals might increase their labor supply to make themselves
eligible for subsidies, while in other cases it might not be, as in the case of TANF or Medicaid
where individuals (primarily women) might take actions to become, or remain, single mothers in
order to retain eligibility for benefits, in most cases reducing their labor supply in the process.
1  A
second issue is whether, even if eligibility status is unalterable or at least alterable but exogenous
to labor supply, the set of eligibility categories, benefit levels, and marginal tax rates assigned to
the different groups in the population makes sense from a normative point of view.  Answering
this question requires a framework to assess normative issues and will not be discussed in this
review, although it is a key design issue for the transfer system as a whole.
The form of assistance varies as well, from cash to in-kind transfers for food, medical
care, housing, and child care.     This is a particular feature of the U.S. system not present in some
European countries, where there are no specific food programs and where health care is more
typically covered by a universal program.    The labor supply effects of in-kind  transfers differ
from those of cash transfers because they subsidize a good which may be a complement or
substitute for leisure, and because in-kind transfers typically provide minimum or fixed quantities
of the good in question and hence have the potential to constrain the consumption choices of the2  This estimate equals the average expenditure per adult plus two times the average
expenditure per child.    It is larger than the amount for many single-mother Medicaid families
off TANF, for whom only the children are eligible.
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family.   What evidence there is on the cash-equivalent value of in-kind transfers suggest that
Food Stamps are very nearly equivalent to cash while Medicaid, housing, and child care are not
(Smeeding, 1982).
Expenditures vary tremendously across programs, with Medicaid being the dominant
program in this respect.   However, the bulk of Medicaid expenditures go for the aged and
disabled; single mothers and their children, the group of most research focus in the literature,
constitute only a little over 10 percent of total Medicaid expenditures.   Among the other
programs, most are in the same general range except for child care, which is considerably
smaller.   The expenditures shown in Table 1 have changed dramatically over the last three
decades, as TANF expenditures (equal to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, AFDC, prior
to 1996) have declined from the largest in the late 1960s to one of the smallest today; as Food
Stamps and Medicaid have grown, particularly the latter; and as the EITC and SSI expenditures
have mushroomed (for more discussion of the history, see Moffitt (2001b)).
The last two columns in the table, showing average expenditures per family of 3 (a rough
measure of benefits) and the marginal tax rate, give some indication of the magnitudes of income
and substitution effects on labor supply, respectively.    Medicaid has the largest average benefits
but, again, are much smaller for a family of three consisting of a single mother and two children,
which are approximately $427.
2   This makes SSI the largest average benefit program, perhaps
not surprisingly since it serves a population which is capable of much less labor supply than the
eligible populations for the other programs.   Transfers for in-kind programs are generally smaller3  Medicaid has many different subprograms and a few currently require copayments, but
they are the exception.
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than those for TANF, necessarily because they are intended to subsidize only part of
consumption.    An exception is the child care block grant program, although benefits in this
program are poorly measured.    The EITC, despite its relative high expenditure level, has, on
average, very low benefits because its recipient base is so large.   As for absolute amounts, the
TANF, Food Stamps, and housing programs (ignoring child care) are sizable relative to fulltime
minimum wage work of $893 per month.
The marginal tax rates (MTRs) in the programs vary greatly.   Those in the TANF
program are now set by the states, and range from 0 to 100 percent (a zero percent MTR is
possible only if the state imposes a maximum income level, which by itself imposes a cliff, or
notch, in the benefit schedule).    SSI imposes a 50 percent rate, Food Stamps imposes a 30
percent MTR, and public housing and Section 8 programs typically impose double MTRS, one
on income net of deductions and one on gross income, ranging from 10 to 30 percent.   The
Medicaid program is the most extreme form of a cliff, or notch, program, which is available in its
entirety (i.e., full subsidized care) until eligibility is ended--such as income exceeding a fixed
amount.
3  The EITC is an earnings subsidy program which has negative MTRs as low as -40% in
its initial subsidy range and positive MTRS up to 21 percent in its phaseout range.
Virtually all of these rates are the same as they were when the program was created, with
occasional important exceptions.  The MTR in the TANF-AFDC program  was 100 percent from
its inception in 1935 to 1969, when it was lowered to 67 percent; the MTR was raised back to
100 percent in 1981, where it remained until the 1996, when states were given freedom to set it at4  Under so-called waiver programs, states began to be allowed to set their MTR in the
early 1990s.  See Moffitt (2001a) for a detailed discussion.
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their discretion.
4    The EITC rates were increased in 1993 as well.
Employment rates in transfer programs generally vary with MTRs in the direction one
should expect.   In TANF, the average employment rate is currently approximately 30 percent,
and is higher in those states with lower MTRs.    Prior to 1996, when MTRs were closer to 100
percent, employment rates among AFDC recipients were approximately 9 percent.    As will be
discussed below, this relationship does not prove that there is an effect of MTRs on labor supply
because a lower MTR has a higher “breakeven” level of hours-worked (i.e., the level at which
eligibility ends) and thus more workers are eligible in that case.  But it does show that the MTRs
are actually enforced and do affect the numbers of recipients combining work and welfare.   The
employment rate in SSI is only 6.7 percent, no doubt reflecting the high rates of disability in the
program.   Food Stamp employment rates are 24 percent.
The actual MTRs in most programs differ in significant ways from the “nominal” MTRs
shown in Table 1, complicating the picture.  Virtually all have exemption amounts of earnings,
below which benefits are not reduced and hence the MTR is zero.   The TANF program, Food
Stamps, Medicaid, and child care programs also all have maximum income limits that create
notches, as benefits and eligibility go to zero for earnings that cause income to exceed those
levels.   In the TANF program, states are allowed to reduce calculated benefits by a fixed
percentage, thereby reducing the MTR by that percent, as well as putting maximums on the
benefit, which effectively creates a region of zero MTR.   Most programs also allow deductions
for work-related expenses and others for consumption items like housing or rental costs, which5  Work-related expense deductions are somewhat ambiguous because, if they do reflect
true costs of working, they do not lower the MTR if the latter were calculated on net income in
the first place.   But the deductions vary considerable from state to state, from program to
program, and over time, and are unlikely to represent true costs of working.
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vary to some degree with income and hence lower the effective MTR.
5    A further wrinkle in
some programs, such as TANF and SSI, is that a different MTR is applied at initial application
for the program as is applied thereafter.   In most cases a 100% MTR is applied at eligibility--that
is, earnings are counted directly against the benefit--and then the lower, nominal MTR shown in
Table 1 is applied after eligibility is established and recipiency has begun.    These types of rules
are designed to discourage entry into the program by workers.  Their theoretical effects will be
discussed below.
The MTRs may be considerably higher for families participating in more than one
program, for the individual MTRs may add up to a considerably higher cumulative MTR.   Table
2 shows multiple benefit receipt among nonelderly single mother families in 1997, excluding the
EITC and child care programs.   Around 16 percent of all single mothers received AFDC,
Medicaid and Food Stamps and possibly one other program.   About 32 percent of all single
mothers who receive benefits from any program at all are in this multiple receipt category; thus
about a third of all welfare recipients in this group have significant multiple benefit receipt.   This
is thus the major multiple recipient category among the programs listed inTable 1.
The cumulative MTR for families receiving these three benefits is not as high as might be
thought, however.   The MTR for Medicaid is zero until the eligibility point for AFDC is reached
(Medicaid eligibility is automatic with AFDC receipt).   Also, the Food Stamp program includes
AFDC benefits as income.  As a result, the cumulative MTR for TANF and Food Stamps6  Adding Medicaid into the calculation would increase MTRs greatly in the second and
third categories, where TANF eligibility is lost.
7  After 1996 states are allowed to count the EITC in TANF income calculations but they
generally do not do so.
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combined is [t + .3(1-t)] where t is the TANF MTR.   Prior to 1996, when t=1.0, the cumulative
MTR was thus simply 1.0, not 1.3.
Cumulative MTRs after 1996 are shown in Table 3 for 12 states.  The income
calculations include the EITC and positive tax payments as well as TANF and Food Stamps, but
not Medicaid.    In the absence of the EITC, moving from 0 hours to part time hours at the
minimum wage results in MTRs ranging from 34 percent to 71 percent.   While these rates are
less than 100 percent, they are not low by most standards (e.g., the positive income tax faced by
most U.S. families).     Moving from part time work to full time work results sometimes in higher
MTRs and sometimes in lower ones, depending on the state.    Higher MTRs typically occur
when the individual hits the TANF income eligibility cliff and loses all benefits, while lower
MTRs typically occur when the individual hits that limit in the neighborhood of part-time hours,
implying that earnings obtained by moving to full-time work are taxed at  lower, nonwelfare
rates.  Moving from minimum wage to $9/hour at full time generally results in somewhat lower
MTRs because usually the individual is off welfare by that point and hence only the nonwelfare
rates almost always apply.    The nonconvex budget set created by this pattern of rising then
falling marginal rates tends to drive labor supply decisions to either extreme (i.e., either down to
part-time work and up to an earnings level considerably above eligibility), a result to be shown
formally below. 
6
The EITC has drastic effects on these rates.
7  Moving from no work to part-time work or9
from part-time work to full time work, rates are lowered by as much as 40 percent, which is the
largest subsidy rate in the EITC.  The resulting MTRs are quite low, no more than 30 percent in
the first case and 47 percent in the second.   However, when moving from the minimum wage to
$9/hour at full time work, the EITC actually increases the cumulative MTR because the
individual is in the phaseout range of the EITC by that point.   Cumulative MTRs are never lower
than 55 percent and are often in the 80-percent range when moving to this higher earnings level.  
Thus the EITC effectively convexifies the budget set, which should be expected to drive labor
supply decisions toward the middle point.    Thus there is an incentive to increase earnings from
no work to full time work but also to decrease earnings from high-wage work to lower-wage
work, with expected ambiguous effects on labor supply (see below).
Finally, it should be emphasized that the benefit formula is not the only source of labor
supply incentives in many U.S. transfer programs, for work requirements have an additional,
perhaps stronger, effect.   In the TANF program, recipients are required to work some minimum
number of hours (usually 20 per week or more) after some minimum stay on the welfare rolls,
and sanctions (i.e., benefit reductions) are applied vigorously if recipients fail to meet the
requirements.   The Food Stamp program also has work requirements for all recipients and
particularly strong requirements for non-disabled single individuals.     Models of work
requirements will be considered below.
II.  Theoretical Models and Issues
Introduction.    The basic static model of labor supply familiar to undergraduate textbooks10
has been the workhorse of the literature on work incentives of welfare programs for over thirty
years.   Despite the clear importance of dynamics, human capital, job search, and other
considerations in the study of the effects of welfare programs, the endurance of the static model
is testimony to its usefulness for the analysis of a wide range of types of welfare program
alternatives and the analysis of the comparative statics of an equally wide range of effects of
simple changes in program parameters.   Its ease of graphical analysis increases its usefulness as
an analytic tool.
Relative to the same model used for the work incentives of income and payroll taxes, the
welfare application has some unique features, however.    One is that the means-testing inherent
in a welfare program necessarily creates a nonconvexity in the budget set somewhere over the
range of earnings, at the very least at the point where income rises to the point of ineligibility.
Changes in welfare reform parameters inevitably either change this eligibility point or change the
incentives for individuals to locate above or below it, and this sets off work incentives which
greatly complicate the analysis relative to that of income and payroll taxes.     A related unique
feature of welfare program analysis is that participation in welfare itself is a choice variable,
partly because of the decision to locate above or below the eligibility point but also, it turns out,
because even some of those whose income is below that point choose not to go onto welfare.  
This also adds some complexity to the model and to the analysis of labor supply effects.
These unique features have important ramifications for normative questions concerning
optimal design of welfare programs.    It turns out that almost all changes in welfare program
parameters have labor supply effects that differ for different individuals in the distribution, and
the desirability of implementing those changes requires a social welfare function or some other11
public choice mechanism which explicitly or implicitly assigns weights to distributional
objectives.    Almost no program reforms have unambiguously desirable labor supply effects on
their own.   Even a program as  well-known and popular among economists as the negative
income tax shares this feature, and its normative advantages in terms of labor supply are quite
questionable without such an analysis.   While the exposition presented below will stick fairly
closely to positive analysis, normative issues will necessarily be referred to in appropriate places.
A final feature of the welfare model also relating to optimal design arises from the above-
noted feature that welfare program participation is a choice and that some choose, voluntarily,
not to participate.    This necessarily self-categorizes the eligible population into those on welfare
and those not, which implies that modifications of the welfare system in the form of adding new
programs--e.g., for food, housing, medical assistance, or job training--must confront how those
programs should be made available to those on the initial welfare program (e.g., cash) and those
not.    Both equity considerations play a role in that decision as well as efficiency ones, for if the
different programs are at all tied together, incentives to join the various programs will be altered.  
A universalist policy which keeps all programs separate and makes all of them available to all of
the low-income population is one extreme, but one that has been rarely chosen by U.S. policy-
makers.
Basic Static Model.     The canonical static model of labor supply considers an individual
with well-behaved preference function over hours of leisure (L) and consumption (C) which we
denote as U(L,C) and budget constraint  N+W(T-L) = PC, where N is exogenous unearned
income, W is the hourly wage rate, P is the price of consumption goods, and T is the total time
available in the interval.    With normalization by P we may relabel C as income, Y.   With hours12
of work defined as H=T-L, we can equivalently consider a preference function U(H,Y)
maximized w.r.t. N+WH=Y.      A generic welfare program provides benefit B=G-t(WH+N),
where G is the guarantee amount given to those with zero income and t is the marginal tax rate.  
With benefits added into the budget constraint, we have W(1-t)H + G-tN=Y.
Figure 1 shows the familiar budget constraint so created as segment CD, where the
intercept with vertical distance AC represents G and where the slope of segment CD is -W(1-t). 
The nonwelfare constraint is AE with slope -W and intercept N (assumed to be zero for
illustration).     The arrows labeled 1 and 2 denote the two types of labor supply response to the
creation of the welfare program, and both result in reductions in labor supply unambiguously.
The nonconvexity of the budget set clearly is a defining characteristics of Figure 1.  It
could be argued that individuals can convexify that constraint by moving on and off the program
over time, thereby achieving an average hours of work and average income that lies above the
constraint CDE.   Put differently, they could “build” a constraint to bridge the nonconvexity.  
Ignoring preference discounting, higher utility could be gained in that way than by choosing a
fixed hours along CDE.   One theory of welfare turnover is that it is induced precisely by this
feature of the constraint, explaining why many individuals alternate between not working at all
and being on welfare with working and not being on welfare, treating the two as mutually
exclusive alternatives.
The existence of nonparticipating eligibles as a complicating factor may be mentioned at
this point.   For virtually all welfare programs, some individuals are observed to locate on
segment AD in Figure 1, in a location which would appear to be inferior to being on welfare.   
One rationalization for this behavior is to assume that being on welfare carries some disutility,8   One approach in the literature to the stigma model is to consider stigma to be a
function of how many other families are on welfare.   This sets up a social interactions model
with interdependent choices in the population.  See Besley and Coate (1992a), Lindbeck et al.
(1999), and Nechbya (1999).
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possibly arising from the stigma of being on welfare (Moffitt, 1983).   This can be modeled by
inserting a welfare participation dummy, P (equal to 1 if on welfare and 0 if not) into the
preference function as in U(H,Y,P), where P has negative marginal utility.   With heterogeneity
of preferences w.r.t. P across the population of a sufficiently wide range, some individuals will
choose not to participate despite the income and leisure gains to doing so.  An alternative
rationalization is to assume that there are fixed costs of going onto welfare in the form of time,
money, or “hassle” costs of complying with the myriad rules of welfare and requirements to visit
the welfare office periodically.    With heterogeneity of such costs across the population, and
with a sufficiently wide range that for some individuals the costs will exceed the utility gains of
welfare participation, some individuals will again choose not to go onto welfare.    These two
models are observationally equivalent without some further structure imposed on them or some
actual data on stigma or participation costs.
8
The labor supply implications of such nonparticipating eligibles are, at this stage,
straightforward, for participation in welfare is more likely, the greater the utility gains from
income and leisure, holding the stigma or fixed costs constant.   Whether labor supply falls or
rises upon joining the welfare program depends on the substitutability or complementarity of P
and L in the preference function, but if P is separable then labor supply will fall, as illustrated in
Figure 1 by the arrow 1.
The most important two comparative statics of the model are those involving the effects9  Ashenfelter (1983) termed the arrow-2 response a “mechanical” change and the arrow-3
response a “behavioral” change.   This interpretation is useful but is complicated by the presence
of nonparticipating eligibles, some of whom in the range DD’ will choose not to go onto the
program despite the potential income and leisure gains.
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of a change in G and a change in t.   Figure 2 illustrates the effect of an increase in G.   All three
types of labor supply effects, shown by the three arrows, are negative.     Note that the change in
labor supply is not a measure of traditional pure income effects because those represented by
arrows 2 and 3 experience substitution as well as income effects, though these operate in the
same direction as the income effects.    Not shown in the figure are the effects on
nonparticipating eligibles, for some individuals will move from segment AD to C’D’ because the
utility gains will now outweigh the costs of participating.
A reduction in t is illustrated in Figure 3, where the pre-change constraint is shown to
have t=1.0 (segment CD).    Again, there are three types of response illustrated in the figure, but
in this case the second two are opposite in sign to the first, resulting in an ambiguous net change
in hours worked.    The average change depends on the sizes of the different responses as well as
the relative numbers of individuals at different initial points along the constraint.    Those
represented by arrow 2 are made newly eligible by the reduction in t  and hence reduce their labor
supply whereas those represented by arrow 3 now find the higher benefits available over the
positive hours range to be sufficiently great as to reduce labor supply to join the program.
9  
Because the region around points D and D’ often fall in the part-time hours range, it can be said
that this reform essentially subsidizes part time work.
Among other things, this result shows why the employment rates or hours of work of
those on welfare may be correlated with the level of t even if there is no labor supply response.  10  An expenditure-constant change in G and t, for example, would rotate the segment
CD’ in a direction increasing the slope, showing more clearly the existence of such a
distributional shift.
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For example, if arrows 1 and 3 are zero and arrow 2 is vertical (i.e., labor supply does not change
when going onto the program for these individuals), then employment rates and mean hours of
work of those on welfare will rise after the reduction in t, but this is just a compositional effect
resulting from the addition of a group of high-hours workers to the welfare rolls.
The implication of this analysis is that the negative income tax, and general reductions in
t,  do not necessarily increase average labor supply (Levy, 1979; Moffitt, 1992).    A corollary of
this result is that it is possible that 100 percent tax rates maximize average labor supply.
However, the distributional impacts of the tax rate reduction must be considered.   The reform
does achieve its objective of encouraging the lowest-labor-supply individuals to work more, but
at the cost of some labor supply reduction among higher-labor-supply individuals, many of
whom are in the group termed the “working poor.”   Incomes are increased among the latter
group (at least for those represented by arrow 2) as well, representing a shift in the income
distributional impact of the welfare program away from the lowest-income individuals and
toward somewhat higher-income individuals, at least in relative terms.
10   Much of the policy
debate over the desirability of a negative income tax and similar reforms revolves around the
relative distributional weights assigned to the very poorest (sometimes called the “target
efficiency” of the program) versus the “working poor, ” who receive no assistance in a t=1.0
program. 
In the U.S. TANF program, states have tried at least two measures to avoid the labor
supply reducing effects of t reductions.   One is to disallow the lower t when considering initial11  Random shocks to labor supply would achieve the same result, e.g., if every individual
has a probability p of being laid off or losing her job each period, after which labor supply can be
freely chosen until the next layoff occurs, individuals will eventually end up at the global utility
maximum regardless of the stricter eligibility rules.
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eligibility, and to allow the lower t only for those individuals who have established eligibility
under the stricter standard.   In a world without transactions costs, these barriers would have no
effect and individuals who wished to locate in the region DD’ in Figure 3 would simply reduce
their labor supply to point C to become eligible and then increase their labor supply to the
preferred point.
11   With costs to entry and application, this process will be slowed but not
eliminated.    A second strategy by states is simply to impose an upper limit on income
independent of the benefit formula, as illustrated in Figure 4.    In that figure, the notch occurs at
point D and the segment DD’ is eliminated, discouraging workers above that point from coming
onto the welfare program.    However, some will still reduce their labor supply to point D in any
case, and labor supply gains that might have been experienced by those initially on welfare who
would have otherwise increased work into the DD’ region are lost, so there is a cost to this
approach.     However, a number of states have taken this approach to its extreme by setting t=0
at the same time as imposing such an eligibility limit.
Figure 4 also illustrates notch constraints in general, as occur in the Medicaid and other
programs.   The dotted line from D to D’ represents the effect of removing the notch and
allowing a gradual phaseout of benefits.    This change has ambiguous effects on labor supply for
the same reason that a general reduction in t does.   While it is true that those initially at D are
encouraged to work more (arrow 1), those represented by arrows 2 and 3 experience labor supply
reductions.   Thus the labor supply effects of eliminating welfare-program notches is ambiguous17
in sign.
A different method of providing work incentives is by increasing the rewards of being off
welfare rather than on welfare.   Whereas the reduction in t attempts to provide incentives by
encouraging individuals to combine welfare and work,  increasing subsidies for those who are off
welfare and work could seemingly provide greater labor supply increases.  Figure 5 illustrates
one real-world case of such a reform, in this case one in which Medicaid is offered to low-
income families off welfare up to some maximum income point (the dotted line C’D’).   An
increase in child support income off welfare has similar effects, but without the notch.  Arrow 1
represents the labor supply increases generated by this reform as some individuals move off
welfare and receive Medicaid while off.    However, labor supply reductions also occur, as shown
by arrows 2,3, and 4  (arrow 4 arises as some of those who did not want to participate in the
initial welfare program find Medicaid acceptable).    Thus the labor supply effects of this reform
are again ambiguous in sign.    
Of course, providing a new form of welfare “off welfare” is just a matter of semantics, for
in essence this reform just adds another layer onto the initial welfare system.   Ignoring the
possible responses of nonparticipating eligibles or different stigma effects of the programs, the
effect of this reform is no different than simply extending Medicaid eligibility for those initially
on welfare up to point D’, which is very similar to a reduction in t.    Alternatively, simply
combining the two programs and having one program with the constraint CDD’ would be
equivalent.   The popularity of some of these reforms to the general public appears instead to be
based on the idea that Medicaid, child support, and other forms of welfare represented by the
constraint C’D’ are preferable to cash welfare possibly represented by CD.    But that requires18
bringing voter preferences into the model, which has not been done here.   In the recipient-
oriented model used here, there is no important difference between “on welfare” and “off
welfare” reforms if they are all essentially welfare, and it is merely a matter of government form
whether assistance is provided in one program or multiple programs so long as the eligibility
groups are identical.    The fundamental design issue of how to construct the overall constraint, 
where assistance should be given across the income and labor supply distribution, and where
labor supply incentives and disincentives are preferred to occur, remains and requires addressing
the same distributional questions already discussed.
Dynamics.   We shall consider three separate topics in this section: (1) welfare program
effects on labor supply in a life cycle context, (2) effects of welfare programs on human capital
investment,  (3) effects of welfare-based human capital investment programs, and (4) time limits
on welfare receipt.   There has been relatively little research on these issues so this section will be
necessarily briefer than the last.
Life cycle labor supply models are generally considered to be separable in order to apply
two-stage budgeting techniques familiar from the literature on consumption (Blundell and
MaCurdy, 1999).    If an individual is on welfare in all periods, the analysis of labor supply
effects of welfare programs is simple because those programs just reduce the net wage and
increase nonlabor income.    This leads to reductions in labor supply in all periods and to
intertemporal wealth effects which also reduce labor supply.     If the individual is on welfare in
some periods and off in others, this also can be accounted for within the framework by the use of
virtual income and virtual net wage formulations (Blundell and MaCurdy).    Intertemporal asset
allocations can be, as before, separated from the within-period decisions, and the latter are12  See Miller and Sanders (1997) for an exception.
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essentially the same as those in the static model with an adjustment in full income to take
account of the asset flows.     Thus the net result of these models in the life cycle labor supply
literature is that there is little if any alteration in the basic labor supply effects found in the static
model.
Two different types of effects are possible, however.   One is the possibility of “building”
a convexified constraint over the nonconvex budget set by moving on and off the program in
different periods, as mentioned previously.  This case has not been analyzed  in the literature. 
Another is the effect of the income floor in transfer programs, which reduces precautionary
saving and hence labor supply, as noted by Hubbard et al. (1995).
Effects of welfare programs on human capital investment have also been little studied.
12 
Kesselman (1976) analyzed the effects of a welfare program on human capital, assuming that the
individual was on welfare both before and after the human capital investment decision.   Under
this assumption, the effect of welfare programs is to reduce the incentive for human capital
investment because both the opportunity cost of time changes from W to W(1-t) and the return to
investment changes from W to W(1-t); thus the rate of return is simply reduced to (1-t) of what it
is in the absence of the program.   This result is identical to that of the effect of a proportional
income tax on human capital investment in an equally simple model.   Income effects play no
role, as is typical in human capital investments which assume perfect capital markets.  
However, an investment in human capital which has a sufficiently high return as to move
the individual above the income eligibility point and hence off welfare has a higher return than
this, because the return, at the margin, remains W rather than W(1-t).    Thus human capital13  The change in H2 resulting from the increase in the wage is ignored for simplicity.
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investment is encouraged relative to what it would be in the absence of the program.   This is
entirely the result of the nonconvexity of the budget set, which leads to a type of increasing
returns to investment.
The effects of human capital investment programs, or job training programs, for welfare
recipients has been discussed by Moffitt (2001a).    The relevant case is that in which a recipient
is required to undergo training as a condition of welfare receipt, and thus human capital
investment becomes a type of work requirement.   In this case the net present value of the
investment opportunity becomes part of the welfare package.  In a two-period model, that net
present value is
                                          1
NPV  =   -W1(1-t)I    +            {P2  [(W2-W1)(1-t)H2 ] 
                                      1  +  r                                                                                                   (1)
                                                                      +  (1-P2) [(W2-W1)H2  - (G -tW1H2)] }
where W1 is the wage if the recipient were not to undergo the training program, W2 is the
(higher) wage in period two if she does, I is the amount of investment time required in period one
(assumed to come out of work time rather than leisure),  H2 is hours worked in period 2, and P2
is a welfare participation dummy in period two if the recipient undergoes the program.
13    The
investment cost is represented by the first term and the return by the term in curly brackets,
which depends on whether the individual is still on welfare after the wage increase.   If not, the
return is equal to the earnings gain minus the welfare benefit lost.    If this net present value is
positive, the welfare program is enhanced in value because it offers a training program with a
positive return which is not available elsewhere, leading to an increase in welfare participation;14  A more interesting question is why time limits would be preferred by the voters to
simple reductions in benefit levels.    This preference is probably based on the assumption that
individuals experience a finite number of discrete negative shocks over their lifetimes and that
full support should be given during those periods but not during others.   A lower but permanent
benefit level would simply lower the amount of support given during the periods during which
negative shocks occur.
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but if it is negative, the value of the welfare program is enhanced and welfare participation will
decline.
If the program is voluntary for welfare recipients, then the value of welfare cannot decline
and welfare participation will ambiguously increase.   Both of these cases illustrate the issue of
tied transfers discussed previously, for a universal human capital program available to all low
income individuals would not have an effect on the welfare caseload as it does in these cases,
when the program is only offered, or mandated, to welfare recipients.
Time limits on welfare receipt have dynamic effects that are more interesting than their
long run static effects.   The long run static effects of time limits are simply to eliminate welfare
completely, and this should be expected to increase labor supply for the same reasons that
welfare decreases labor supply in the first place.   Supporters of time limits sometimes argue that
mandatory human capital investment programs of the type just discussed would, if required
during all available years of welfare receipt, increase potential wages enough that a former
welfare recipient could be better off after the end of the time limit by working than he or she
would have been on welfare.   The empirical evidence on the rates of return to these programs
does not support this conjecture, at least on average (see below).   Instead, time limits are best
interpreted as simply a desire to reduce redistribution.
14
There are two types of dynamics effects that could arise from the presence of time limits. 15 See Gottschalk (1988) for a model of the effect of welfare programs on job search and
Krueger and Meyers (in this volume) for a review of the unemployment insurance literature.
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One would occur if individuals on welfare anticipate the approach of the limit and begin to leave
welfare and accept job offers at an increasing rate as the limit nears.  This behavior has been
noted for unemployment insurance recipients approaching the point at which their benefits will
be exhausted (Moffitt, 1985).   In the UI case, this behavior is generally explained by the
randomness of wage offers and the desire to accept an attractive offer when it arrives even if it
does so somewhat in advance of the benefit exhaustion date.  The same may apply for welfare
recipients approaching a time limit.   The result is that labor supply will begin to increase in
advance of the actual time limit, and that labor supply effects would be observed to occur even
for those who do not actually exhaust their benefits.
15  
A second response can occur if recipients “bank” their benefits by going off the rolls
during good (labor market) times and saving their benefits for bad times (downturn in labor
market, unexpected negative income shock, etc).   This result again requires the presence of
uncertainty in future wage offers.  A simple artificial model proves the possibility of this
response.   Suppose that the lifetime consists of two periods and that welfare can only be
received in one of them.   The per-period utility function is  Y-!H where Y is income and H is a
dummy equal to 1 if the individual works and 0 if not.   Let B be the welfare benefit and suppose
that an individual has a per-period probability p of a wage draw W>0 and probability 1-p of a
wage draw W=0.    To make the comparison stark, let the positive wage draw equal B.   Then, in
the absence of any time limit, the individual will be on welfare both periods regardless of the
wage draw because even if a positive wage is drawn, the disutility from working will make23
welfare participation the preferred choice.    But with a time limit, an individual who has drawn a
positive wage of B in the first period and is choosing whether to work and stay off welfare vs
going onto welfare and using up her entitlement compares utility for these two alternatives,
which are, respectively
        B  -  !   +  "[pB + (1-p)B]      if work in period 1                                                       (2)
        B           +  "[p(B-!) +  (1-p)0]        if go onto welfare in period 1                              (3)
where "<1 is the discount rate.  The value of working in period 1 is therefore
        -!(1-"p)  +  "B(1-p)                                                                                                     (4)
If p<1 then this quantity can be positive if the second term is larger than the first.   Thus the
person will choose to work today and go onto welfare tomorrow even though the myopic
decision today would be to go onto welfare.
Work Requirements and Tagging Models.   In several U.S. welfare programs, work
requirements have become an alternative means by which labor supply of welfare recipients can
be increased.    Figure 6 shows the effect of such a program which requires Hmin hours  of work
on the part of the recipient.  This eliminates the portion of the budget BC.  Arrows 1 and 2 show
possible responses, both of which lead to increases in hours of work.    A work requirement,
therefore, unambiguously increases labor supply.   This should not be surprising because it is
equivalent to eliminating welfare altogether over a certain hours range, and welfare is known to24
decrease labor supply unambiguously.
This favorable result is often contrasted by policy-makers with a reduction in t, which
yields ambiguous effects on labor supply.    However, the comparison is not appropriate because
the conventional welfare program attempts to provide support to those who have sufficiently low
wages (perhaps because of health reasons or very young children) that their hours of work are
low or zero whereas a work requirement system provides no such support.   Work requirement
programs instead must necessarily be accompanied by a categorization of the welfare population
into those who can work, who are given the budget constraint shown in Figure 6 with a minimum
hours requirement, and those who cannot work, who are give support even at zero hours.    Work
requirements also stand in contrast to the idea of a negative income tax, which attempts to
provide income support to those with low wages at the same time as providing some work
incentives (through a reduced t).   The favorable labor supply effects of work requirements are
entirely dependent on the ability to adequately categorize the welfare population into the two
groups.
There is a literature on tagging and related issues which considers the properties and
desirability of these types of categorical systems.  Akerlof (1978) showed that if individuals can
be “tagged”  as nonemployable, they can be given a greater G and lower t than they could under a
noncategorical negative income tax.   He, and others in this literature, directly dealt with the
incentive problem to change categories by requiring that an incentive compatibility constraint be
set that would discourage such behavior.    Parsons (1996) extended the Akerlof model to
consider what he termed “two-sided” error, meaning that not only are some of the untagged
individuals truly nonemployable, but some of the tagged individuals are in fact employable.   16 For other papers in this literature, see Beaudry and Blackorby (1998), Chone and
Laroque (2001), Cuff (2000), and Immonen et al. (1998).
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This leads to an optimal structure in which a positive G is given to both tagged and untagged
individuals, but a higher G and lower t is given to the tagged group.    More direct consideration
of workfare as an alternative is considered in other papers.  For example, Besley and Coate
(1992b, 1995) showed that, under a different optimization criterion, workfare can be used as a
screening device to ensure that higher-wage individuals do not take advantage of the program.   
In this rather different justification for work requirements, all recipients must undergo the cost of
complying with work requirements, but benefits can be higher because high-wage individuals
have been screened out.
16 
The literature surrounding the negative income tax in the late 1960s and early 1970s
emphasized the difficulties in tagging.  It was generally argued that the administrative difficulty
in assigning recipients to categories is too great for work requirements to avoid large error.  It
was also argued that work requirements would inevitably end up giving individual caseworkers
in local welfare offices great discretion in deciding who is able to work and who is not, and that
this would create an unacceptable level of inequitable treatment across individuals who are
observationally identical (Barth and Greenberg (1971), Browning (1975), Lurie (1975)).
Wage and Earnings Subsidies.   Wage and earnings subsidy programs have been
discussed for many years as a means to increase labor supply incentives.   In a wage subsidy, a
government subsidy increases the hourly wage of an individual by [!-"W], where W is the
individual’s initial wage and "<1.   The resulting remuneration per hour for an individual is
! + (1-")W.   The subsidy declines as W rises and reaches zero at W=!/".    In an earnings17 In some earnings subsidies, like the U.S. EITC, there is a flat range of earnings in the
middle over which the subsidy stays at its maximum, before starting to decline.  There is a large
literature on wage and earnings subsidies dating from the 1960s and 1970s.  For some of the
early discussions, see Barth and Greenberg (1971), Garfinkel (1973), Kesselman (1969, 1973),
and Zeckhauser, 1971.
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subsidy, an individual receive a subsidy S=sWH for earnings up to some cutoff level C, where
s<1, and after that cutoff level the subsidy is recalculated as S=sC - r(WH-C), which declines at
rate r for every dollar of earnings.    The subsidy reaches zero at earnings equal to [C(s-r)/r].  The
net wage up to C is W(1+s) while the net wage above C is W(1-r).
17
Figure 7 shows how both types of subsidy affect the budget constraint.  The wage rate
subsidy creates the budget constraint AC while the earnings subsidy creates the constraint ABD. 
The labor supply responses are indicated by the arrows.   The response for the wage subsidy is
represented by arrows 1 and 2.   While those entering work from nonwork clearly increase labor
supply, the income and substitution effects of those initially at positive hours go in opposite
directions, leading to a change ambiguous in sign.   However, most of the groups made eligible
for these subsidies have forward-bending labor supply curves, so the impact of the subsidy is
generally expected to be positive.    The earnings subsidy has the same effect in low ranges but a
negative effect in the higher ranges of earnings and hours worked, where the earnings subsidy is
reduced.   Arrows 3 and 4 both represent reductions in labor supply.   The net effect of the
subsidy is ambiguous in sign.   As for the welfare programs discussed earlier, the distributional
impact of the program is important because the positive and negative labor supply effects occur
in different ranges.
A simple comparison of the wage and earnings subsidies in the Figure indicates that wage
subsidies, because they do not have the taxback region BD, are more likely to increase labor27
supply than earnings subsidies.     However, the wage rate subsidy must nevertheless be phased
out as the wage rises, and this creates a disincentive for human capital investment, job search,
and other activities seeking higher wages.  As it has turned out in the U.S., wage-rate subsidies
have foundered in any case on the administrative difficulties of measuring hourly wages and
basing a transfer on them.   Many individuals are not paid by the hour, for example, and even
those that are often have an agreement with the employer for a stipulated number of hours of
work, making the contract closer to an earnings agreement than an hourly wage agreement.  
Further, a wage-rate subsidy creates opportunities for fraudulent collusion on the part of the
employee and employer to set the pay in terms of earnings rather than wages and then to
overstate hours of work, pushing the reported wage rate down and the subsidy up.   Preventing
manipulations of the reported hourly wage would be quite difficult.  For this reason, earnings
subsidies, which are administratively simpler to conduct, are more common, even though they,
too, have some incentives for overreporting of earnings (Hotz and Scholz, forthcoming).
The goal of wage and earnings subsidies is explicitly to increase earnings and labor
supply.   A secondary goal--though a primary one to some voters and policy-makers--is to
increase government support for the “working poor,” roughly meaning those families and
individuals with significant hours of work but still low earnings.   An earnings subsidy can be
designed so that the maximum subsidy at point B in Figure 7 is in the middle of the range of
earnings that define that group.   This is a purely distributional goal that, in principle, could be at
odds with the goal of increasing labor supply, particularly if the labor supply disincentives in the
taxback region are significant.    As has been demonstrated in several programs already in this
review, subsidizing one part of the hours or earnings distribution tends to draw individuals to that18  In the U.S., most welfare programs do not include the EITC as part of income.   If they
did, the effect of the earnings subsidy in pivoting the segment CD in Figure 8 around to CF
would be much smaller.  Indeed, if t=1.0 in the welfare program, there would be no effect at all
of the earnings subsidy on the slope of this segment if the earnings subsidy is included as income.
19  As noted previously in the discussion of the Medicaid expansions and child support
programs, many policy makers and analysts regard earnings subsidies as “not welfare” because
they are not stigmatizing to the recipient and are more highly valued by the voter.   This
discussion ignores those effects.   If stigma is less for the earnings subsidy than for income
transfers, it is also possible that an individual on welfare may move off the welfare rolls to
segment AD in Figure 8 and receive only the earnings subsidy, becoming an eligible
nonparticipant for welfare.
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region from both above and below.
Earnings subsidies have also been proposed for those demographic groups who are
eligible for an existing income transfer program, in the hopes that the earnings subsidy can
counter the labor supply disincentives created by the tax rate of the welfare program.   The
combination of the two is illustrated in Figure 8, which is drawn on the assumption that the
maximum earnings subsidy occurs at an hours level in excess of the hours level which ends the
income transfer.
18   Compared to the income-transfer-only, the addition of the earnings subsidy
has the same mix of positive and negative labor supply effects as the pure earnings subsidy,
leading to ambiguous effects on labor supply.   However, labor supply incentives for initial
welfare recipients are all positive (assuming forward-bending labor supply curves) and it is
possible as well that those recipients may “leave welfare” in some cases.
19   As illustrated in
Table 3 discussed earlier, earnings subsidies have greatly reduced the cumulative marginal tax
rate on earnings for welfare recipients, although they have also raised that rate at higher levels of
earnings.   This effect is clear from Figure 8.
The shift in Figure 8 is the same as that created by a reduction in t in a welfare program at29
point F and below and differs only above F.  The labor supply disincentives shown by arrow 4
are also the same as those created by the reduction in t.   However, the labor supply disincentives
represented by that arrow occur at a higher level of earnings than would occur from a reduction
in t equivalent in magnitude to that created by segment CF (i.e., if CF were extended upward, as
in the case of a t reduction). In this sense, the earnings subsidy simply pushes the labor supply
disincentives further up the earnings and hours distribution than they would be under a reduction
in t.  Once again, the desirability of this shift depends on the distributional weights assigned to
the groups in the population.   On the other hand, if point G falls closer to point F than is shown
in the figure, then there is little difference in an earnings subsidy addition and a reduction in t in
the first place.
The comparison of the program shown in Figure 8 with a reduction in t in a welfare
program is also complicated by the fact that public expenditures are almost surely higher for the
Figure 8 earnings subsidy addition than by the reduction in t, for subsidies are paid out at much
higher earnings levels which are typically in much thicker regions of the income distribution.  
This makes it appear as though all individuals can be made better off and no one worse off.   A
fairer comparison would be an expenditure-constant comparison of an earnings subsidy addition
versus a reduction in t, for in that case the level of G would have to be lower at the time the
earnings subsidy is introduced to reduce expenditures.    This demonstrates more clearly that the
earnings subsidy addition is a regressive program relative to a program which reduces t, for it
shifts support, in relative terms, away from the worst-off families and individuals and toward
those who are better off.  This is the underlying reason for its favorable effects on labor supply.
Finally,  Figure 9 shows the effect of offering the earnings subsidy only to welfare30
recipients who work a minimum number of hours, a suggestion that has been made by some
welfare policy analysts.   For the same reasons as work requirements in general, this will result in
an increase in labor supply relative to a earnings subsidy program without any such minimum
hours rule, as shown by the arrows in the figure.  However, some individuals who would have
increased their labor supply by a smaller number of hours will fail to do so under this program,
so some labor supply gains will be lost.  Also, once again, the distribution of government support
shifts in this case, in relative terms, away from the worst off and toward the better off, in return
for the more favorable labor supply effects.
In-Kind Transfers.   There is a small literature on the effects of in-kind transfers on labor
supply relative to the effects of cash transfers (Gavhari, 1994; Leonesio, 1988; Murray, 1980).   
At first glance, there does not seem to be any issue, given that in-kind transfers in developed
countries like the U.S. do not subsidize the market price of the commodity directly, as in
developing countries, but rather simply provide families with a fixed amount of the good.   That
fixed amount initially seems close to having the same effect as an increase in income.   For
example, suppose the utility function is U(L,S,C) where L is hours of leisure, S is the quantity of
the subsidized good, and C is the quantity of other consumption goods.   Let the amount of the
gift of the subsidized good be pS* = pG - t(WH+N), where p is the market price of S, G is the
maximum amount of the good given, t is the MTR in the program, and W, H, and N are as
defined in the static labor supply model (H+L=T).   Then the resulting budget constraint is 
W(1-t)H + N(1-t) + pG  =  pS  + qC (5)31
where q is the price of C.  This constraint looks very much like the constraint for a cash transfer,
for the relative prices of S, C, and H (or L) are the same as they are in a cash transfer.
However, as the above-cited studies demonstrate, the more interesting case is when the
optimal S resulting from the maximum problem presented by the budget constraint in (5) is less
than the S* amount granted by the government.   In this case the individual is constrained to
consume more of the good than he would have if the transfer had been provided in the form of a
lump sum cash grant.   This distortion of the consumption of S has effects on the consumption of
L and C.   The basic result from the studies is that if S and L are Hicks-Allen substitutes, then the
effects of such an “over-provided” in-kind transfer is to increase hours  of work rather than
decrease them, because L is reduced by the excess consumption of S.    If S and L are
complements however, the opposite is likely to occur.
There is no strong empirical evidence on this issue to date.   The Food Stamp program in
the U.S. is generally considered to be nearly equivalent to cash because the amounts of food
coupons provided to families are generally less than they appear to spend, i.e., they are
inframarginal (Currie, forthcoming).    On the other hand, Medicaid and housing subsidies have
cash-equivalent values less than one because individuals would in almost all cases consume less
than the quantities provided by the government if the transfer were in cash.   But what evidence
there is suggests that these programs have work disincentives, but there has been no strong
comparison of those effects relative to those of cash transfers.20  See Heckman (2000) for a discussion.
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III. Empirical Evidence: A Short Review
Introduction.   The volume of research on the effects of welfare programs on labor supply
has been cyclical over the last three decades.  While there was a large amount of research in the
late 1960s and 1970s, there was relatively little in the 1980s and early 1990s.   There has been a
resurgence of interest in these issues in the 1990s, however, accompanied by an increase in the
volume of new work.
Methodological controversies have been a major focus in this literature and continue to
be at the present time.    One controversy has been over the relative merits of structural versus
reduced-form estimation of the effects of policy variation, and another has been over the best
sources of policy variation to use when estimating either structural or reduced form models.   
This distinction is not always fully understood.    The first issue concerns whether some
particular source of policy variation--such as cross-state variation in welfare rules, for example--
should be used to estimate black-box impacts of policy difference without using economic
models in any formal sense and without estimating any underlying behavioral elasticities, such as
income and substitution effects.     The primary argument for structural estimation in this sense
has always been that it affords a superior method of conducting out-of-sample forecasting of
untested and unimplemented policies than can the estimates from reduced form models.
20   
While the evidence on this issue is not conclusive at this time, it is a fact that estimation of
reduced-form impacts of policy variation has become more common than structural estimation in
the literature.
The second issue concerns whether the best source of variation to use is pure cross-21  Using non-policy sources of variation to identify policy impacts is in a different class.  
The main argument for using such non-policy variation (e.g., variation in wages alone to identify
the effects of W(1-t) when there is no variation in t) is that it is the only alternative if there is no
direct policy variation cross-sectionally or over time. 
22  For reasons of length, and not because of any lack of inherent interest, the literature
from countries other than the U.S. will not be reviewed.
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sectional variation in policies across areas (when it is available), variation across areas in how
policies change over time (e.g., the state fixed effects model), or variation between somehow-
defined “eligible” and “ineligible” populations, either in pure cross section or over time (the
difference-in-difference method).   The latter two sources of variation have been more heavily
used than the first.    When these different sources of variation are each used to estimate just-
identified models, it is generally not possible to test them against one another, which is one
reason for the continued disagreement on which source is preferable.   But whatever source of
variation is used, either structural or reduced form estimation can be applied to it.
21
The issue of the source of policy variation is the more important one in the analysis of the
effect of welfare programs on labor supply.   Some programs in the U.S. (TANF, Medicaid, child
care subsidies, housing programs) have considerable cross-sectional variation as well as variation
over time that differs across areas, furnishing the opportunity for the use of more than one type
for identification.   Yet other programs (the EITC, Food Stamps, SSI) have essentially no cross-
sectional variation because they are national in scope and the same rules apply to everyone. 
These latter programs must use some other source of variation for estimation and usually it is a
source which will rest on more tenuous assumptions.
The review of the empirical literature below is divided into sections based partly on these
issues.
22   The pre-1995 literature will first be reviewed, for that literature tended to estimate23  There was one state fixed effects estimate from this literature (Moffitt, 1986).
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structural models and use certain types of sources of variation for identification.    The post-1995
literature will then be reviewed, first covering structural estimation and then estimation of
reduced-form policy impacts.   For the most part, the labor supply literature in this area is much
thinner than might be supposed and hence there are not many studies to review.
Pre-1995 Estimates.   There have been several major reviews of the pre-1995 literature on
the effects of welfare programs on labor supply (Danziger et al., 1981; Moffitt, 1992; Hoynes,
1997) which exhaustively cover the studies.  That literature will therefore not be rereviewed here
in detail but rather merely summarized.    Most of the studies estimated the effects of the AFDC
program and consisted of structural or quasi-structural models, using pure cross-state variation in
AFDC benefits along with other sources of identification to obtain parameter estimates.
23   They
found almost universally that the AFDC program reduced labor supply by from 10 to 50 percent
of non-AFDC levels.   The substitution and income elasticities estimated from the literature fell
into the general range of those elasticities obtained from the literature on substitution and income
effects estimated from wage and nonlabor income variation, respectively, suggesting that the
simple static theory--which presumes these elasticities to be the same--is roughly verified.
This literature also addressed the effects of a reduction in t and the ambiguity of labor
supply response noted in the previous section.    In general, it was found that for single mothers,
the primary eligibility group for benefits, average labor supply was quite inelastic with respect to
changes in t holding G fixed, suggesting that the labor-supply-inducing and labor-supply-
decreasing effects roughly cancelled each other out (see Moffitt, 1992, for a discussion).   While
these effects were obtained by simulation, using structural estimates of substitution and income24  The results of the NIT experiments will also not be reviewed here.  See Moffitt and
Kehrer (1981) and Burtless (1987) for reviews.
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elasticities to forecast the positive and negative labor supply responses to a reduction in t over the
income and hours distribution, they are consistent with reduced form estimates from the negative
income tax experiments.
24    The NIT experiments tested multiple G and t combinations and
hence it was possible to determine the average effect of a change in t, holding G fixed, by
comparing treatment-control outcomes across different experimental groups.   The results
showed a very mixed pattern of results, with labor supply levels sometimes higher and
sometimes lower with no consistent pattern and with few significant differences (SRI
International, 1983, Table 3.9).
Fortin et al. (1993) addressed the social welfare issue referred to previously by simulating
the effects of different combinations of G and t on a variety of social welfare indices, most of
them based on Atkinson-style inequality aversion scales.   Using a calibrated model with
assumed elasticities, and a data set of Canadian families, the results showed a large number of
“perverse” effects of a reduction in t on labor supply, consistent with prior evidence.   However,
the programs that most often maximized social welfare were those with relatively low levels of
both G and t.   At these levels, the amount of redistribution is not very high and, further, they
occur in a range where reductions in t tend to increase average labor supply.   The paper thus
presents a useful exercise on how to address this important question, even though the results may
be specific to the data set used and to the income distribution in the Canadian data set used for
the analysis.
A scattering of estimates were obtained for other programs.   Estimates of the effect of the36
Food Stamp program showed very little labor supply response, possibly because the benefit
amounts in the program are quite small relative to those of cash programs.   There were a fairly
large number of estimates of the effect of Medicaid on labor supply, with the majority indicating
some significant work disincentives of the program, albeit concentrated among those in poor
health (see Gruber, forthcoming, for a review of these studies).    One study attempted to estimate
the labor supply effects of housing programs using a very indirect method of identification, rather
than variation in housing programs per se, and found the program to reduce hours of work by
about 4 percent (Murray, 1980).  There were also a number of structural estimates of the effect of
the price of child care on labor supply, both before and after 1995 and using similar methologies.  
 These studies almost uniformly show negative price effects on employment, implying that child
care subsidies will indeed increase employment (see Blau, forthcoming, for a review of this
literature). 
Post-1995 Structural Estimates.   Because of the decline in structural estimation in the
labor supply literature, there have been few structural estimates of labor supply responsiveness. 
Table 4 shows four of the more well-known studies.   Hoynes (1996) studied the AFDC-UP
program and found it to have significant negative effects on the labor supply of husbands and
wives, but that marginal reductions in t had little effect, consistent with prior work.  Hagstrom
(1996) estimated the effect of the Food Stamp program on labor supply and found it to have very
small effects, even smaller than those found in the pre-1995 literature.   This reinforces the sense
that the Food Stamp program has little effect on work disincentives.   Keane and Moffitt (1998)
focused on the labor supply effects of participating in multiple programs, including not only
AFDC but also Food Stamps, subsidized housing, and the Medicaid program.  They showed that25  Because Meyer and Rosenbaum examined employment rather than hours of work, the
“perverse” effect of a change in t could not occur.   They briefly examined effects on hours of
work as a sensitivity test but they noted that the model independent variables were not set up for
that dependent variable.
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cumulative tax rates were generally greater than 100 percent in this case.   Nevertheless, while
their estimated substitution and income elasticities were sizable, the net effect on labor supply of
reducing the marginal tax rates to a level below 100 percent was negligible.   Meyer and
Rosenbaum (2001) focused on an attempt to explain the increase in employment rates among
single mothers from 1984-1996.  They found that AFDC benefits and tax rates (the latter
affecting potential benefits if working) had expected effects on employment probabilities, but
that the time series increase in single mother employment was less affected by changes in those
parameters and other welfare variables than a change in the generosity of the EITC over the
period.
25
Some of the simulations of alternative programs conducted by Keane and Moffitt bore on
one of the issues raised in the theoretical section above, which is whether wage and earnings
subsidies are likely to draw welfare recipients off welfare and into the (subsidized) private labor
market.    Keane and Moffitt found AFDC and Food Stamps to have heavy stigma attached to
them but they assumed that there would be no stigma associated with a wage or earnings subsidy
program.   As a consequence, they found the latter types of programs to have much higher
forecasts of work incentives than reductions in the welfare tax rate t.    Whether there would be
any stigma attached to such programs is not clear, however (see also Keane (1995)).
Post-1995 Reduced Form Policy Impact Estimates.   The literature on estimating the
reduced form impact of policy changes on employment and earnings is also exceeding modest. 26  See Hotz and Scholz (forthcoming) for a more detailed review of these EITC studies
and a number of others that used indirect estimation methods to simulate the effect of the EITC
on labor supply.   It should be noted that the Eissa-Hoynes study, while using direct policy
variation for reduced form estimation, also translated their impacts into estimated income and
substitution elasticities.
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Yelowitz (1995) used the expansion of Medicaid in different states and in different age groups of
children to estimate their impact on employment, and found those expansions to have a positive
effect on employment rates.   A number of policy-impact studies of the effect of the EITC on
labor supply have also been conducted (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Eissa and Hoynes, 1998). 
The results show that the EITC increases employment probabilities for single mothers but has no
net effect on their hours of work, if working.   This is consistent with the notion that labor supply
is encouraged among initial nonworkers but that the taxback region of the program reduces labor
supply enough to cancel out the effects among workers.   As noted above, Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2001) also estimated the effects of the EITC on single mothers and also found it to have
significantly positive effects on employment probabilities.   The results from the Eissa-Hoynes
study shed light on the effects of the EITC on married men and married women.  The findings
were that the EITC increased the employment probabilities of married men but decreased those
of married women, and that it decreased the hours of work of workers of both men and women. 
The results for married women may be because many of them are located in the taxback region
because their husbands have significant earnings in and of themselves and the wives may be
regarded as the marginal worker, even at the first dollar.   The hours results for men may be a
result of the same taxback region.
26
These constitute the main body of this type of work and is, as already noted, quite small
in volume.  There have been no studies of this type for the SSI program at all, nor any new39
studies of the Food Stamp or housing programs.
Many more studies have been conducted of the effects of the 1996 welfare legislation, the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which
transformed the AFDC program into the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program by introducing time limits, work requirements, and devolved responsibility and block
grant funding to the states (see Moffitt, 2001a, for a detailed review of its provisions).    There
were also a number of studies of so-called “waiver” programs just prior to 1996 under which
states undertook to test programs that were in most cases similar to the later national PRWORA
legislation.    Evaluating these waiver programs was made possible by the fact that different
states tested different types of programs and did so at different calendar times, furnishing
variation in policy which could be used to estimate impacts on labor supply and other outcomes.  
However, evaluating the 1996 legislation is difficult because it was implemented nationally and
all states had to come into compliance with its main provisions.    Thus there was no cross-state
variation in the overall nature of the program.   
As a consequence, difference-in-difference methods have generally been used for the
evaluation of the effects of TANF.     As Ellwood (2000) and Schoeni and Blank (2000)  note,
use of these methods is particularly problematic when other reforms, such as the EITC, were
occurring roughly simultaneously, and when business cycle and economy-wide trends were
occurring which could affect different groups differently.  A further difficulty in evaluation has
arisen because the separate impacts of time limits, work requirements, and other provisions has
been difficult to determine even in the pre-1996 waiver period.  This is partly because a state’s
choice of those components is correlated with other characteristics of the state, and partly27  An exception is Grogger (2000, 2001), who has attempted to estimate the independent
effects of time limits by using age variation in children combined with assumptions that that
variation does not interact identically with other welfare reform features.  The validity of the
assumptions needed for these methods to be unbiased is unknown.
28  There have been many more random-assignment studies in this period but those listed
in Table 5 constitute those which had all of the main features of PRWORA, namely, time limits,
work requirements, sanctions, and enhanced earnings disregards, and which made these reforms
within the AFDC system rather than outside of it.
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because their implementation was often significantly different than what would be expected from
their formal definition.    As a consequence, while there are a number of estimates of the overall
impact of welfare reform in this period, taken as a whole, there are almost no credible studies of
the impact of different individual components of reform taken individually.
27
Table 5 shows the main studies estimating the overall impact of the pre-1996 waiver
programs and of TANF.   With a few exceptions, the studies show waivers to have had positive
effects on most measures of labor supply and negative effects on measures of AFDC
participation, as expected.    These studies all control for the state of the economy, usually by
controlling for the unemployment rate, so the estimated effects of welfare reform are all intended
to be net of the strong economy.
Two entries in Table 5 are for experiments which made use of traditional random-
assignment methods rather than cross-state variation in the presence of reform.   These studies
generally also find positive effects on employment and earnings and negative effects on welfare
participation.
28    However, random-assignment methods are not well-suited for major structural
reforms like the pre-1996 welfare waivers--or for TANF itself--because such structural reforms
tend to cause changes in local labor markets and local communities that feed back onto the
control group, and because structural reforms tend to have significant effects on entry into29  Another difficulty in the use of experiments for evaluating structural welfare reform is
that the control group is often contaminated by the general atmosphere of reform which changes
the expectations of the eligible population as a whole.
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welfare.   Experiments produce biased estimates of total reform effects under these
circumstances.
29
The estimates of the effects of TANF are generally positive on employment and earnings
but not always.   Further, in some cases the effects of TANF cannot be separated from the effects
of other policy changes occurring at the same time, as emphasized by Ellwood (2000); he
concludes that these difficulties are sufficiently severe that the separate contributions of welfare
reform, the EITC, and the economy cannot be identified.    McKernan et al. (2000) and Schoeni
and Blank (2000) are the other two studies using difference-in-difference methods, one of which
finds TANF to have increased employment while the other finds it not to have done so but to
have affected family earnings, income, and AFDC participation.    The two studies used different
control groups so this may be the source of the difference.   What evidence there is, therefore,
indicates some TANF effects in the expected direction but the small number of studies and
problems in statistical inference make the conclusions rather uncertain.
IV. Summary
The labor supply and other work incentive effects of welfare programs have long been a
central concern in economic research.    Work has also been an increasing focus of policy
reforms in the U.S., culminating with a number of major policy changes in the 1990s whose
intent was to increase employment and earnings levels of welfare recipients and other42
disadvantaged individuals.    This review of the theoretical and empirical literature on this issue
reveals that there is much that remains to be done to gain a full understanding of these programs.
Many issues relating to the optimal levels of welfare program parameters and the social
desirability of labor supply effects in different parts  of the income distribution remain to be
studied, a key issue.  New policy initiatives in the area of work requirements, time limits, and
other topics have been understudied, as have dynamic models of labor supply response.   The
proper integration of the complex multi-program environment in the U.S. is also a needed area of
research.
Even more on the empirical side, more research is needed in a number of areas.  While
traditional studies of the effect of AFDC guarantee and tax rates are reasonably plentiful,
structural or quasi-structural models of the effects of welfare reforms in the 1990s are rare and
yet are needed to understand the mechanisms by which effects of that reform have taken place as
well as to forecast the effects of new policies.    Many programs other than TANF are quite
understudied, especially the SSI program but also including the Food Stamp and Medicaid
programs.    Even the EITC, which has seen a considerable amount of research attention, has at
present been the subject of only a modest number of studies.    Thus there are many areas of new
research to be conducted on the effects of welfare programs on labor supply.4344
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Characteristics of Major Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the U.S.
       Program                  Main Eligible          Form of                         Annual               Average Monthly                 Marginal Tax Rate      
                                         Population
a          Assistance                  Expenditures
b           Expenditure for                      on Earnings
                                                                                                           (FY2000 )                Family of 3






Cash 14,490 600 Ranges across















e Ranges from -40%
to 21%
Food Stamps All individuals and
families







f 0% or >100%Table 1 (continued)
       Program                  Main Eligible          Form of                         Annual               Average Monthly                 Marginal Tax Rate      
                                         Population
a          Assistance                  Expenditures
b           Expenditure for                      on Earnings
                                                                                                           (FY2000 )                Family of 3






Housing units 22,498 422
g Ranges from 20%
to 30%
Child Care
     Child Care          






f Sliding fee scale set
by states (can be
zero)
     Dependent Care











a  In addition to low income and assets
b  Combined federal and state and local; in millions
c Includes tax reduction as well as refundable portion
d Combined Section 8 and public housing
e Per filing unit, tax year 2000
f  FY1999
g  Family or dwelling unit
h  FY1998, for 2 children in child care
Sources: Blau (forthcoming), Burke (2001), Rowe and Roberts (2002), U.S. House of Representatives (2000)Table 2
Multiple Benefit Receipt by Nonelderly Single Mother Households, 1997
(percent distribution)
No Program 48.0
AFDC, Food Stamps, Medicaid, and another program 10.4
AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid only 6.0
AFDC, Medicaid, and another program 1.1
AFDC and Medicaid only 0.7
Medicaid only 6.2
Food Stamps only 1.8




Source:  Tabulations from the Survey of Income and Program Participation by Kara Levine,
University of Wisconsin.Table 3
Cumulative Marginal Tax Rates for Recipients of
TANF and Food Stamps in 12 States, 1997
(percent)
                                   From No Work to       From Part Time Work     From Minimum Wage
                                  Part Time Work at         to Full Time Work        to $9 Hourly Wage at
                                    Minimum Wage            Minimum Wage               Full Time Work    
                                                                                                               
                                 Without        With           Without         With         Without           With
                                   EITC           EITC           EITC            EITC           EITC             EITC
Alabama 46 6 33 9 24 58
California 50 9 67 33 67 89
Colorado 57 17 71 39 29 59
Florida 46 6 59 28 35 63
Massachusetts 57 13 64 28 64 87
Michigan 63 23 84 47 35 63
Minnesota 55 8 65 27 69 89
Mississippi 34 -6 32 7 24 55
New Jersey 64 23 62 30 41 67
New York 65 16 67 27 55 84
T e x a s 5 01 02 40 2 55 7
Washington 71 30 67 33 50 76
Notes:  
Income includes earnings, TANF and Food Stamp benefits, federal and state EITC amounts, less
employee payroll and federal and state income taxes.   Minimum Wage is $5.15 per hour. 
Family size of three assumed.
Source:  Coe et al. (1998, Tables 4,5).Table 4
Recent Structural Models of the Effect of  Welfare Programs on Labor Supply
       Author and                       Data                       Population                 Dependent                      Welfare                        Results


















































































declines increase itTable 5
Studies of the Overall Effect of Welfare Reform on Labor Supply
              Study                                  Program(s)                         Dependent                         Source of                     Estimated  Effect
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earnings, no effect on
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Moffitt (1999) All state waiver
programs
AFDC participation









effect on weeks and
hours worked; negative
effect on AFDC
participation rateTable 5 (continued)
              Study                                  Program(s)                         Dependent                         Source of                     Estimated  Effect
                                                            Studied                               Variable                   Program Variation           of Welfare Reform
Mueser et al. (2000) Waiver programs in
five urban areas
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Figure 9. Earnings Subsidy with a Work Requirement Plus Welfare Program  
 
 